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Rigorous pretesting, including insights from social science, could improve 
hurricane forecast graphics aimed at the general public.
S ocieties’ ability to cope with natural hazards  such as hurricanes is mediated by many factors,  including socioeconomic constraints (Diaz 
and Pulwarty 1997; Peacock et al. 1997), cultural 
preferences (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Hewitt 
1983; Whitehead 2003), demographic patterns 
(Pielke and Landsea 1999; Pielke and Pielke 1997), 
technological and scientific advances (Rappaport 
and Simpson 2003), and the communication and 
subjective interpretation of probabilistic informa-
tion (National Research Council 2003; Loewenstein 
et al. 2001; Kahneman et al. 1982; Murphy et al. 
1980). This article focuses on media and public 
interpretations of the National Hurricane Center’s 
(NHC’s) “cone of uncertainty”1 (“COU”), a hurricane 
forecast graphic that circulated widely in Florida 
during the active 2004 Atlantic hurricane season 
(1 June–30 November), and concludes with a broader 
discussion of hurricane forecast graphics from the 
perspective of risk communication theory.
The cone of uncertainty is only one piece of infor-
mation that may be used in an individual’s decision-
making process; thus, no claims of direct causality re-
garding evacuation behavior or other public responses 
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1 Although the image is officially referred to as the “Tropical Cyclone Track and Watches/Warning,” in interviews and by the 
media it has been given several different titles (to be discussed later). For the purpose of this paper we refer to it as the “NHC 
cone of uncertainty,” unless otherwise specified.
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are made in this article. 
Nonetheless, secondary 
ev idence gleaned from 
other sources, including 
surveys of hurricane be-
havior, media reports, and 
in-depth interviews with 
hurricane forecasters, sug-
gests that many members 
of the public pay close 
attention to this graphic, 
consider it as part of their 
decision-making process, 
and, at times, misinterpret 
it. The importance of this 
graphic was also identi-
fied by a comprehensive, 
multiagency study of be-
havioral responses, includ-
ing evacuation actions, by 
officials and the general 
public in Florida during 
the 2004 hurricane season, 
conducted by the Federal 
Emergency Management 
Agenc y (FE M A),  U. S . 
Army Corps of Engineers, 
and National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA). One of the 
three “most striking” findings of this study was that 
“too many people place undue confidence in the fore-
cast track of the storm” (USACE 2005a, p. 12).
During the annual North Atlantic hurricane 
season, Florida is inundated with information regard-
ing hurricane preparedness and updates on looming 
storms. NOAA’s NHC2 relies heavily on the private 
sector to disseminate forecast information (Golden 
1984). When a tropical cyclone threatens to make 
landfall, local television news stations often go into 
continuous coverage, alternating between forecast in-
formation, live footage of current weather conditions, 
and updates on government actions (e.g., evacuation 
orders, shelter locations, school closures, etc.).
The centerpiece of information used by both the 
NHC and the media to communicate hurricane risk to 
the public prior to landfall is the cone of uncertainty 
graphic (Fig. 1). This graphic has been coined “the 
cone” by the mass media (an abbreviation of a number 
of terms, including “cone of uncertainty,” “cone of 
probability,” “cone of error,” and the “cone of death”). 
Modified versions of the original NHC product have 
become familiar figures to most Floridians, and this 
iconic image is now firmly embedded in popular 
culture (Fig. 2). For example, one local news stations 
now offers the “cone on your phone” as an alterna-
tive way to access forecast information when a storm 
threatens South Florida (see information online at 
www.wsvn.com/eupdate/phonealerts.html).
The NHC cone of uncertainty includes the 
following several elements: the forecast track line, the 
white “cone” used to symbolize the 10-yr-averaged 
forecast error, colors used to designate hurricane 
watch and warning areas, and background elements, 
such as the legend, scale, and underlying map (e.g., 
of the southeast United States, the Gulf of Mexico, 
etc.).
The intention of the NHC cone of uncertainty, as 
described by the Tropical Cyclone Program Manager 
at the National Weather Service Headquarters, is “to 
provide information on any given tropical cyclone 
2 NHC is part of the National Center for Environmental 
Prediction (NCEP) and the Tropical Prediction Center of 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 
National Weather Service (NWS).
FIG. 1. “The cone of uncertainty.” A: Solid white area of cone indicates aver-
age forecast error out to 3 days, B: present location of storm’s center, C: 
forecasted location and intensity (i.e., H = Hurricane, S = tropical storm, D = 
depression) at a given time, D: nonwhite area of cone indicates average fore-
cast error for days 4 and 5, E: coastlines under a watch/warning indicated by 
color-coded highlighting, and F: forecast track line, skinny black line (online 
at www.tpc.ncep.noaa.gov/archive/2004IVAN_graphics.shtml; modifications 
used to describe image made by authors).
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so those potentially impacted can make timely and 
responsible decisions” (S. Kiser 2005, personal com-
munication). Nonetheless, the 2004 hurricane season 
(in which four named storms struck Florida) dem-
onstrated that hurricane-warning graphics, despite 
admirable attempts by the forecast community to 
make user-friendly products and to reach out to 
emergency managers and the media, are subject to 
misinterpretation by many members of the public. 
Based on interviews with key government officials 
and media figures, archival research of Florida news-
papers, analysis of the 962 responses to a NWS request 
for comments on their cone of uncertainty graphic, 
surveys from the “2004 Hurricane Season Post Storm 
Assessment” of the National Hurricane Program, and 
the risk communication literature, this paper identi-
fies several characteristics of the graphic that likely 
contribute to public misinterpretations. We suggest 
that NHC forecast providers both reevaluate their 
message (the cone) and more systematically identify 
the needs and predispositions of target audiences in 
order to design better information products.
The evolution of hurricane forecasting and dissemination. 
Technological advancements in radar and weather 
reconnaissance aircraft have greatly improved 
hurricane forecasts (Rappaport and Simpson 2003). 
By 1954, 24-h forecasts of hurricane tracks were being 
made. By 1961, forecast ability extended to 48 h, and 
by 1964 72-h forecasts were being made (DeMaria 
and Gross 2003). Today, hurricane forecasting relies 
heavily on satellite data and imagery, especially out-
side the North Atlantic Ocean, where the use of air-
craft reconnaissance is not as common (Willoughby 
2003). Still and animated satellite images of hurricane 
tracks over ocean and land are prevalent features of 
televised hurricane forecasts.
The NOAA Environmental Visualization Program, 
part of the NOAA National Environmental Satellite 
Data and Information Service (NESDIS), provided 
satellite images of hurricanes with overlaid forecast-
track information for the first time in 1999. Although 
these new images were not official forecasts, all in-
formation in the images was scientifically accurate. 
Local and national news media quickly adopted and 
broadcasted these images to the public (T. Loomis 
2005, personal communication).3 Some research-
ers have attributed reduced U.S. mortality from 
hurricanes “at least in part, from the visual impact of 
broadcast satellite information” (Willoughby 2003).
Hurricane-track forecasting continues to improve. 
As of 2005, NHC 3-day-track forecasts are now as 
accurate as 2-day forecasts were in the late 1980s 
(see information online at www.nhc.noaa.gov/
verification/). By contrast, storm intensity remains 
hard to forecast, in part because relatively weak hur-
ricanes can grow into major storms in just a few hours 
(Landsea and Lawrence 2004).
Hurricane forecasting, however, still retains 
subjective elements. Forecasters consider computer 
model output, current weather conditions, and their 
own individual experience in the process of con-
structing a forecast. In other words, forecasts are not 
solely the result of computer simulations; thus, “if 
you were to plot the model guidance and the official 
forecast on one chart, you would normally see they do 
not match . . .” (S. Kiser 2005, personal communica-
tion). Forecasters draw on an assortment of models, 
including statistical, trajectory, and dynamical mod-
els (J. Franklin 2005). Because of the improvements in 
three-dimensional dynamic models, NHC forecasts 
have improved substantially in the past 15 yr (J. 
Franklin 2005, personal communication). Forecasters 
FIG. 2. Examples of the cone’s use in popular culture (available online at www.big106.com; www.news-press.com).
3 Although Loomis found it hard to believe that the Environ-
mental Visualization Program was the first to produce such 
images, we were not able to find anyone at NHC that could 
recall if these images began elsewhere (T. Loomis 2005, 
personal communication; S. Kiser 2005, personal commu-
nication).
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often average the results of several well-performing 
models. These “consensus” model averages are con-
sidered useful starting points and “on average outper-
form even the best-performing members of the con-
sensus” (J. Franklin 2005, personal communication). 
If there is no particular reason to prefer one model 
within the consensus over the others, the consensus 
results are used in the construction of the forecast. 
After evaluating all information, including model 
output and individual analysis of current weather 
conditions, and drawing upon personal experience, 
the official hurricane forecast is ultimately made by 
a single person—the hurricane specialist on shift (J. 
Franklin 2005, personal communication).
A second subjective element is a self-imposed 
reluctance by the NHC to make drastic changes from 
one advisory to the next, that is, the so-called “wind-
shield wiper effect,” for fear of sending mixed and 
contradictory signals to decision-making authorities 
(S. Kiser 2005, personal communication; J. Franklin 
2005, personal communication). Franklin (2005) 
states, “It is far better to have a modest response lag 
than to jerk the forecast back and forth.” Forecasters 
are well aware that the naming of a hurricane and 
forecasting storm track and intensity initiates a host 
of responses from government agencies, emergency 
management organizations, and the private sector 
(Saffir 2003). The dramatic consequences of initiating 
hurricane warnings are increasingly evident as soci-
etal vulnerability to storm damage has greatly risen 
due to increasing U.S. coastal populations and coastal 
development (information online at www.magazine.
noaa.gov/stories/mag167.htm). Thus, there are ex-
tensive socioeconomic implications for both false 
alarms and missed warnings. Also, because lives and 
property are at risk, forecasters prefer to err on the 
side of safety and are reluctant to cancel hurricane 
warnings, even after projections begin to indicate 
that a storm is likely to move away from land, so that 
they may be “as sure as we can [before] conveying a 
diminishing sense of threat” (J. Franklin 2005, per-
sonal communication).
Emergence of “the cone.” The NHC cone of uncertainty 
that included a track line first appeared in 2002. 
Prior to the cone of uncertainty, graphical warn-
ings included a dark red circle in the center of an 
orange circle, representing winds of 74 mph or 
greater, a white line to represent the storm’s past 
track to date, red highlights to represent areas under 
hurricane warnings, yellow for hurricane watches, 
pink for tropical storm warnings, and light blue for 
tropical storm watches (see, e.g., information online 
at www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2000/). While the 
NHC produced these images, accompanying text 
and a crude track chart was provided by the National 
Weather Service Headquarters. A change in senior-
level management, technological advancements in 
computer graphics programs, and the increased 
use of e-mail with attachments at NWS led to the 
requirement for images with clearer depiction, more 
information, and ease of dissemination to NOAA 
Headquarters, the Department of Commerce, and 
the White House. Over time the requirements for the 
images outgrew the abilities of the National Weather 
Service Headquarters staff and responsibility was 
transferred to the NHC.
In 2002, the watch and warning graphic was 
further developed to include a white cone of uncer-
tainty, intended to illustrate the potential geographic 
range of the track of the tropical cyclone center. 
However, the image retained the coastal highlights, 
indicating watches and warnings (Fig. 1, noted as 
E). The NHC COU (Fig. 1, noted as A and D) is 
constructed by connecting the outer boundaries of a 
series of concentric circles by a tangential line, which 
is why the cone’s end is rounded. Each circle repre-
sents a forecasting period (e.g., 36 h) and, critically, 
has a radius equal to the average error in all forecasted 
hurricane tracks over the previous 10 yr, in nautical 
miles (e.g., 128 nm). The cone’s vertex (Fig. 1, noted 
as B) represents the present location of the storm’s 
center and widens as the area of average error be-
comes larger. The solid white area depicts the forecast 
up to 3 days into the future (Fig. 1, noted as A). The 
hatched area was added in 2003 and represents a 
forecast average error for days 4 and 5 (Fig. 1, noted as 
D). In reality, the NHC’s COU accurately predicts the 
ultimate path of the tropical cyclone’s center about 2/3 
of the time (J. Franklin 2005, personal communica-
tion). In other words, one out of three storm centers 
directly impact areas outside of the cone.
It is important to emphasize that the cone of uncer-
tainty only forecasts the potential track of the center 
of any tropical cyclone (depression, storm, hurricane), 
and not the extent of the storm. Thus, the cone does 
not represent the size of the hurricane, its intensity, or 
the potential swath of destruction. The cone only illus-
trates where the eye of the hurricane may travel, based 
on the average error of track forecasts of all hurricanes 
over the previous decade; thus, all hurricanes in a given 
year (e.g., 2005) are illustrated with the exact same 
cone of uncertainty. The cone is not tailored to the 
size, severity, or previous behavior of each individual 
storm, which is perhaps the more intuitive, but incor-
rect, interpretation of the graphic, especially by the lay 
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public. Unfortunately, the NHC Web site, during the 
2004 season, did not provide a detailed description of 
how the cone of uncertainty was made, although on 
the “frequently asked questions” page (online at www.
aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/F7.html), the NHC described 
the characteristics of a storm in relation to the warning 
graphic associated with each time period (but again, 
not how the cone was constructed):
NHC forecast tracks of the center can be in 
error . . . This display shows an approximate repre-
sentation of coastal areas under a hurricane warning 
(red), hurricane watch (pink), tropical storm 
warning (blue) and tropical storm watch (yellow). 
The orange circle indicates the current position of 
the center of the tropical cyclone. The black line and 
dots show the National Hurricane Center (NHC) 
forecast track of the center at the times indicated. 
The letter inside the dot indicates the NHC’s forecast 
intensity for that time.
 It is also important to realize tropical cyclones are 
not a point. Their effects can span many hundreds 
of miles from the center. The area experiencing hur-
ricane force (one-minute average wind speeds of at 
least 74 mph) and tropical storm force (one-minute 
average wind speeds of 39–73 mph) winds can extend 
well beyond the white areas shown enclosing the 
most likely track area of the center. The distribution 
of hurricane and tropical storm force winds in this 
tropical cyclone can be seen in the Cumulative Wind 
Distribution graphic displayed below.
The “track line” in particular has led to public 
confusion, misinterpretation and controversy 
(Fig. 1, noted as F). A series of black dots represent 
the forecasted position of the eye through time. The 
letters within the dots indicate the storm’s status (i.e., 
tropical storm or hurricane) and were added in 2004 
(Fig. 1, noted as C). The dots are then connected by 
a black line, running through the center of the cone 
of uncertainty. The line represents the forecasted 
track of the storm’s center, and the times indicate the 
storms’ expected time of arrival at the specified geo-
graphic location. Overall, the cone of uncertainty has 
changed little since it was first introduced in 2002.
MEDIA AND PUBLIC INTERPRETATIONS. 
Four diverse sources of convergent evidence allow us 
to infer media and public (mis)interpretations of the 
cone of uncertainty. These include 1) interviews with 
local and national television meteorologists about the 
cone, 2) a multiagency survey on the public response 
to Hurricane Charley (2004), 3) analysis of newspaper 
articles discussing the cone, and 4) public comments 
on the cone of uncertainty and two proposed alter-
natives posted on the NHC Web site after the 2004 
hurricane season.
Interviews with television meteorologists. Local televi-
sion stations have become key intermediaries in the 
communication of hurricane risks. All major local 
television stations in Florida repeatedly broadcast their 
own modified versions of the NHC cone of uncertainty 
during the 2004 hurricane season. Drawing upon the 
official NHC forecast, individual stations often alter 
the color and style to match the station’s graphical 
formats and color schemes, but occasionally make 
more fundamental changes, including the removal of 
the hurricane forecast track line.
Television meteorologists in south Florida view 
hurricanes as their “Superbowl” moment, when public 
attention is focused upon them and their forecasts 
prior to a storm’s landfall. In our interviews, all of 
them stated that a critical responsibility during hur-
ricanes is not only to provide an accurate forecast, 
but also to provide psychological support before the 
hurricane makes landfall. “It’s not just the forecast,” 
said B. Norcross (2005, personal communication), “the 
whole thing is an emergency message.” Many of these 
meteorologists have experienced multiple hurricanes 
and are key sources of information for the public. They 
also have a unique perspective on public understanding 
and reaction to hurricane forecasts, through both 
direct public feedback and viewer ratings.
We interviewed meteorologists from several local 
television stations: Bryan Norcross and Craig Setzer 
from the CBS affiliate WFOR, John Morales from 
Telemundo (an exclusively Spanish station), and Don 
Noe from the ABC affiliate WPLG. During “normal” 
weather forecasting, individual meteorologists typi-
cally develop their own forecasts and graphics. For 
hurricanes, however, many news stations rely on 
the official NHC forecast. They do, however, often 
modify the appearance of the NHC cone of uncer-
tainty graphic. For example, WFOR in Miami uses 
the official NHC forecast and data to construct their 
own cone with the track line removed (B. Norcross 
2005, personal communication). WFOR uses the 
NHC data to avoid confusing the public with conflict-
ing forecasts (C. Setzer 2005, personal communica-
tion). B. Norcross (2005, personal communication) 
and D. Noe (2005, personal communication) each 
said that when on-air, they try to explain what the 
cone of uncertainty is and what it means in detail, 
while J. Morales (2005, personal communication) 
said he does not.
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Morales said that while he uses the NHC forecast, 
he does not always agree with it. He argued that giving 
his own opinion and offering as much additional in-
formation as possible, even if it contradicts the NHC 
forecast, helps people make their own decisions. He 
only provides contradictory information, however, 
if he has very strong feelings based on his own 
experience. Similarly, during Hurricane Charley, 
meteorologists Jim Reif from ABC affiliate WJLA and 
Robert Van Winkle from NBC affiliate WBBH each 
notified their viewers of a wobble on the radar that 
seemed to indicate that the storm had veered from 
its forecasted track several hours before the NHC 
mentioned the change. Thus, these broadcasters went 
“out on a limb without the hurricane center,” said Reif 
(Boxleitner 2004).
Several of the meteorologists we interviewed 
have removed the forecasted track line from their 
station’s graphics. C. Setzer (2005, personal com-
munication) expressed concern that the line conveys 
more certainty than actually exists. Even with the 
line removed, he and his colleagues consciously 
strive to emphasize the uncertainty in the image (C. 
Setzer 2005, personal communication). The Weather 
Channel, another important source of information 
for the public (USACE 2005b, p. 60), also removed 
the track line. One station, however, that does con-
tinue to include the track line from the NHC graphic 
is WPLG. Their alterations, done by a third-party 
graphic provider, include color coding to reveal the 
projected Saffir–Simpson category at a given time. 
The line is described on-air as the forecasted track 
line, followed by a description of the error associated 
on either side of the line. The exact wording varies by 
the meteorologist broadcasting at the time (D. Noe 
2005, personal communication). A second broadcast 
that continues to use the track line is the national 
CBS Evening News. They explained they do not have 
their own staff meteorologists and therefore use the 
information directly from the NHC. The graphic 
image is changed slightly, however, to remain consis-
tent with the program’s visual formats (News Desk, 
CBS Evening News 2005, personal communication). 
Finally, Morales at Telemundo also uses the graphic 
from NHC. The graphic is altered only for aesthetic 
purposes and accompanies his verbal commentary (J. 
Morales 2005, personal communication). Thus, com-
munication of the official NHC cone of uncertainty 
to the public is mediated by the differing interpreta-
tions and strategies of local weather forecasters, who 
are often the primary source of hurricane warning 
information for the public. In essence, several dif-
ferent versions of the cone are currently being com-
municated to the public, with possibly significant 
consequences. It is outside the scope of this study to 
determine the relative effectiveness of the various 
modifications to and explanations of the NHC’s COU 
made by the media.
2004 Hurricane Charley. In 2004, Florida was struck 
by four hurricanes in just 2 months (Charley, Frances, 
Ivan, and Jeanne). The NHC cone of uncertainty 
graphic became the subject of controversy after 
Hurricane Charley, with some critics claiming that 
it confused the public because it “unduly focused 
the users of the graphic too much on the track fore-
cast line” (S. Kiser 2005, personal communication). 
Hurricane Charley provided an illustrative example 
of how the cone of uncertainty graphic may lead some 
to misinterpret forecasts.
By 11 pm Wednesday, 11 August, most of Florida’s 
west coast was under a hurricane watch. By 5 pm 
the next day, hurricane warnings extended from the 
lower Florida Keys to north of Tampa Bay. Critically, 
however, the track line within the cone of uncertainty 
graphics issued by the National Hurricane Center 
between 5 am on Thursday, 12 August and 11 am 
on Friday, 13 August projected that the center of 
Hurricane Charley would pass directly over Tampa 
Bay. The track line within the cone of uncertainty 
graphic issued at 2 pm on Friday, 13 August, however, 
suddenly projected that the hurricane would pass 
instead over Charlotte County approximately 
100 miles south of Tampa (Fig. 3). Hurricane Charley 
ultimately struck Punta Gorda, about 70 miles south 
of Tampa, at about 3:45 pm as a category 4 storm, with 
winds of 145 mph. Charlotte County, which contains 
one of the largest percentages of people older than 65 
in the nation (Breed 2004), was devastated. Charley 
became one of the costliest storms in U.S. history, 
causing an estimated $15 billion in damage (adjusted 
for inflation) (Blake et al. 2005).4
In the aftermath, it became evident that many 
people in Charlotte County had not evacuated. Some 
argued that the cone of uncertainty graphic had 
played a role. There are contrasting points of view 
on how the media provided information to the public 
based on the NHC forecast and/or cone of uncertainty 
graphic. For example, FOX4 News meteorologist Dave 
Roberts stated, “A lot of the folks here [in Charlotte 
County] weren’t taking it [Charley] seriously. It 
was supposedly this big problem for Tampa Bay.” 
4 For a detailed description of the meteorological conditions 
and characteristics of Hurricane Charley and all other named 
Atlantic storms during 2004, see Franklin et al. (2006).
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(Boxlietner 2004). WFOR News meteorologist Bryan 
Norcross argued that much of the television cover-
age on Florida’s west coast inappropriately urged 
the public to pay attention to the forecasted track 
line, leaving those within the cone, but not on the 
line, vulnerable to wobble in the hurricane’s path 
(B. Norcross 2005, personal communication). The 
NHC cone of uncertainty graphic was also criticized 
by some county officials. For example, John Wilson, 
head of emergency management for Lee County (also 
impacted by the storm), subsequently argued that the 
NHC should eliminate the track line because it caused 
confusion. For example, early forecasts showing the 
line shifting from Fort Myers (in Lee County) to 
Tampa Bay led some residents of Fort Myers to believe 
they were out of harm’s way (Boxlietner 2004).
Yet, landfall probabilities along the entire southwest 
Florida coast, including Charlotte County, remained es-
sentially the same all of Wednesday and Thursday (infor-
mation online at www.tpc.ncep.noaa/gov/archive/2004/
CHARLEY.shtml). Charlotte County was also well within 
the area of the cone in the forecast graphics produced 
during this time, and National Hurricane Center fore-
casters repeatedly cautioned people that forecasts were 
imprecise. Afterward, in response to criticism about the 
Charley forecast, Max Mayfield, director of the NHC, de-
fended the sudden change in the storm track just before 
Charley made landfall. He argued that there should have 
been no surprise:
The Charlotte Harbor area was within the hur-
ricane warning area for 24 hours. They were in the 
cone of uncertainty for four days. [emphasis added] 
The strike probability at 5 a.m. on the morning 
of landfall—and landfall was about 4 p.m.—was 
50 percent, and higher than that at 11 a.m. So they 
really shouldn’t say they were surprised. For us, that 
was a very good forecast (Stone 2005).
FIG. 3. Three consecutive forecasts for hurricane Charley. Many people were misled by the forecasted track line. 
Notice the sudden shift of the line toward the south (available online at www.tpc.ncep.noaa.gov/archive/2004/
CHARLEY_graphics.shtml).
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The key issue, however, was that the NHC track 
line for forecasts issued on 12 August and early on 
13 August consistently went near Tampa.
A subsequent multiagency survey of public 
behavior during Hurricane Charley found that the 
majority (57%–68%) of respondents in all areas 
studied said the cone of uncertainty graphic was a 
“very important” factor in their evacuation decision 
(USACE 2005b, p. 38).5 Likewise, in an open-ended 
question, the forecasted track of the storm was one of 
the highest volunteered reasons for why individuals 
either did or did not evacuate, demonstrating that 
many Floridians were using some version of the cone 
of uncertainty graphic in their decision making.
The survey also found that people living within 
category 1 risk zones in Tampa Bay were significantly 
more likely to evacuate (53%) than people living in 
similar zones in southwest coastal Florida (including 
Charlotte County; 31%) (USACE 2005b, p. 4). The 
survey also found that Tampa Bay residents were 
more likely (68%) than residents in southwest coastal 
Florida (59%) to say that the forecast graphic was very 
important in their evacuation decision. By contrast, 
of those respondents from southwest coastal Florida 
who did not evacuate, roughly half said they “would 
have left had it appeared that Charley was going to 
hit their location directly.”
Misinterpretations of the cone of uncertainty were 
not limited to Hurricane Charley. One of the primary 
conclusions of the multiagency survey of behavior 
responses to all of the storms of the 2004 hurricane 
season was that “Many people believe the storm 
will miss them, placing too much faith in the storm 
forecast track” (USACE 2005c). Likewise, this study 
also concluded, based on interviews with Emergency 
Medical Associates (EMA) management personnel, 
that “Some EMA’s focused too much on the forecast 
track” (USACE 2005d).
Taken together, none of these results conclu-
sively demonstrate that public misinterpretations 
of the cone of uncertainty graphic were a decisive 
influence on hurricane-related behavior. Protection 
and evacuation decisions and behavior are clearly 
the result of a complicated set of factors, including 
the forecasted storm track, storm strength, official 
evacuation notices, housing types, previous hurricane 
experience, access to transportation, fear of looters, 
pet ownership, etc. Yet collectively, they do suggest 
that public misinterpretation of the graphic, such as 
the tendency to overfocus on the track line, may be 
common and may be an important factor in public 
decision making.
Newspaper analysis. Newspapers are another key 
source of information about hurricanes for the 
public. In order to examine newspaper interpreta-
tions of the cone of uncertainty, we gathered articles 
from 14 major Florida newspapers using LexisNexis 
and the Miami–Dade Public Library System data-
bases. Searches were made for articles containing the 
phrases: “cone of uncertainty,” “cone of probability,” 
“cone of error,” “cone of terror,” “cone of possible 
tracks,” and “cone of death” for the period from 
1 January 2004 to 16 August 2005.6 Table 1 shows 
the number of articles found in each paper and Fig. 4 
shows a graphical representation of readership by 
each Florida paper.
KEY TERMS. A total of 101 articles were analyzed; “cone 
of uncertainty” and “cone of probability” were the 
most commonly used terms (Fig. 5). It is possible 
TABLE 1. Number of articles between 1 Jan 2004 
and 16 Aug 2005 mentioning “the cone.”
Newspaper title Number of articles
Daytona Beach News-Journal 2
Miami Herald 8
Orlando Sentinel 10
Palm Beach Post 28
Sarasota Herald-Tribune 2
St. Petersburg Times 3
The Tampa Tribune 7
Tallahassee Democrat 4





South Florida Sun-Sentinel 10
Total 101
5 It should be noted that although the report did assess public use of the cone of uncertainty and distinguished key elements 
of the graphic, it did not identify to whose version of the cone (e.g., NHC, particular media outlet, etc.) respondents were 
referring.
6 Again, newspaper articles usually did not identify to which version of the cone of uncertainty (e.g., NHC, particular media 
outlet, etc.) they were referring.
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that some people may interpret the 
word “probability” (the chance that 
a given event will occur) incorrectly 
as “probable” (i.e., likely to happen; 
Jardine and Hrudey 1997). Thus, the 
word probability in the cone of prob-
ability may lead some to conclude 
that hurricane-track forecasts are 
more certain than they are in reality. 
The NHC does not use the term cone 
of probability, preferring instead 
cone of uncertainty. In fact, hurri-
cane specialist James Franklin of the 
NHC was not familiar with the term 
cone of probability (J. Franklin 2005, 
personal communication). Yet, 38% 
of the articles analyzed used the cone 
of probability label. At a minimum, 
the use of different terms may lead to 
public confusion, and perhaps even 
significant misinterpretation. This, 
along with public interpretations of 
the graphic itself, is a critical need 
for future research.
TRACK LINE. Much of the controversy 
generated by Hurricane Charley cen-
tered on claims that the public was 
overconfident in and reliant upon the 
track line, that is, the “skinny black 
line” embedded in the white cone that 
depicts the forecasted track of the hurricane center. In 
the days and hours leading up to the landfall of Charley, 
multiple cone of uncertainty graphics had projected that 
the eye would hit Tampa. In the last hours, however, the 
storm veered from this track line and hit Punta Gorda 
and Charlotte County instead. This shift in the track 
line remained well within the cone of uncertainty, and 
yet as described above, many subsequently criticized the 
NHC’s graphics. After Hurricane Charley, there were a 
FIG. 4. Newspaper readership numbers. Circulation numbers were 
used for Palm Beach Daily News because readership numbers were 
not available.
number of articles that debated what should be done 
about the skinny black line that apparently had caused 
so much public confusion.
Of the articles reviewed, 42% stated that people 
should simply not focus on the line because the 
white cone is actually more important (Fig. 6). For 
example, Ben Nelson, state meteorologist for Florida, 
said, “There are lessons to be learned from every 
catastrophic event [i.e., Hurricane Charley], and the 
FIG. 5. Number of times a phrase used/total times a 
phrase is used.
FIG. 6. Regarding “skinny black line.” Percentages are 
of total number of articles (i.e., one article may contain 
more than one category).
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lesson we need to learn here is people cannot focus 
on that line the hurricane center provides” (Garcia 
and Bell 2004). Likewise, Max Mayfield of the NHC 
stated, “If you know what the black line means and 
how to use it, there’s no problem. But some people 
don’t know how to use it” (Kaye 2005). He also joked 
that he should have “Don’t focus on the skinny black 
line” engraved on his tombstone (Kaczor 2005).
Another 13% of articles argued that the line should 
simply be removed from all future uses of the graphic 
because people overfocus on the line. For example, 
one article quoted meteorologist Steve Jervis of NBC 
affiliate WFLA: “People just see it [the line], and 
their eyes go for right to it.” Likewise, Michele Baker, 
emergency management director of Pasco County 
stated, “sometimes because it’s there, people become 
fixated on it. I think the loss of the line is a good 
thing” (Johnson 2004).
By contrast, 10% of articles said that the line 
should be kept in future versions of the graphic. For 
example, the editors of The Tampa Tribune argued, 
“Unfortunately, some people want to change the 
National Hurricane Center’s ‘cone of uncertainty’ 
graphic to provide less information” (The Tampa 
Tribune 2005a). Another person (a f light instruc-
tor at Embry-Riddle and an avid forecast watcher) 
argued that the line is “a good thing, but people need 
to learn more about what it means” (Pulver 2004). 
In an interview, Max Mayfield said that FEMA also 
wanted to keep the line (Johnson 2004).
Finally, 35% of the articles tried to provide some 
explanation of what the line represents. Most expla-
nations, however, were probably not very helpful. For 
example, “That’s the most likely forecast track, as 
established by the National Hurricane Center” and 
“The line shows the forecaster’s best prediction of a 
storm’s track. The swath, called the cone of probability, 
shows possible errors in the forecast” (Kleinberg 2004; 
The Tampa Tribune 2005b). These many articles 
provide additional circumstantial evidence, from the 
perspective of forecasters, meteorologists, evacuation 
officials, and journalists actively engaged with the 
public, that the cone of uncertainty graphic has pro-
duced some level of public confusion.
Public comment. In response to public and media 
criticism, the NWS requested public comments on 
the NHC cone of uncertainty graphic and two new 
alternatives using an online survey. Respondents were 
asked to vote for their preferred graphic among three 
options (Figs. 7a, 7b, 8a, 8b, 9a, 9b).
The call for comments was advertised by issuing a 
public information statement to the media, emergency 
managers, private sector, etc. It was also advertised on 
the Tropical Prediction Center Web site. Finally, local 
NWS Weather Forecast Offices were asked to spread the 
invitation via their more direct contacts at the local level 
(S. Kiser 2005, personal communication). The NWS 
received 962 responses. Importantly, however, this was 
not a representative survey of the general population. It 
was conducted online; thus, participation was strongly 
biased toward those with Internet access and, perhaps 
more importantly, a preexisting interest in the NHC 
and its Web site. Thus, the survey was based on indi-
viduals self-motivated to take the survey, which likely 
produced a biased sample.7 Unfortunately, because of 
legal constraints, the NWS was unable to collect demo-
graphic information, making it impossible in the end to 
determine how representative the results are.
The survey used relatively vague, open-ended 
questions and did not ask respondents to explain 
their preferences. Also, some respondents clearly did 
not understand that the survey presented only three 
options, not six (Figs. 7–9). The source of their confu-
sion was the survey itself, which pictured the three 
alternative graphics using two different storms—one 
that moved along a linear track and one with a more 
complex track that looped in a circle. For example, 
one respondent wrote, “I prefer Graphic 1a . . . Next 
best is 1b in my opinion,” even though 1a and 1b actu-
ally represented the same graphic. Another respon-
dent stated, “Option 2A is the least confusion. The 
‘b’ options are useful, but to the majority of people, 
they are JUST TOO cluttered and way too confusing 
looking.” Thus, it is clear that some respondents mis-
interpreted the graphics presented in the survey. Not 
only could the survey have been better constructed, 
but these responses provide further evidence that 
people have trouble interpreting the cone of uncer-
tainty. Respondents’ preferences were grouped into 
the following five categories by the NHC: 1) option 
1 (the original cone of uncertainty graphic, Fig. 7), 
2) option 2 (Fig. 8), 3) option 3 (Fig. 9), 4) no prefer-
ence, and 5) cannot determine (Table 2).
OPTION 1 (THE ORIGINAL CONE OF UNCERTAINTY GRAPHIC, 
FIG. 7). Of the three alternatives provided, a major-
ity of respondents preferred option 1, representing 
the original cone of uncertainty. In their comments, 
several respondents mentioned a “margin of error” 
while another stated, “ . . . I believe many people 
7 However, the final decision on which graphic to use con-
sidered newspaper articles, personal contacts and other 
unsolicited comments sent in to the NWS (S. Kaiser 2006, 
personal communication).
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FIG. 7. Option 1 offered by NHC in the request for comments. Note that this is the originally used image (online 
at www.nhc.noaa.gov/graphicsprototypes.shtml).
FIG. 8. Option 2 offered by NHC in the request for comments (online at www.nhc.noaa.gov/graphicsprototypes.
shtml).
FIG. 9. Option 3 offered by NHC in the request for comments (online at www.nhc.noaa.gov/graphicsprototypes.
shtml).
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(including myself) focused too much on the ‘center 
line’ of the forecasts.” These comments imply that 
some respondents had correctly understood what 
the cone of uncertainty was supposed to symbolize. 
Other comments, however, indicate that many 
continued to misinterpret this graphic: “Stay with 
graphic 1. This shows the past and forecasted track 
of the storm.” In fact, the graphic depicts only the 
present location and forecasted track of the storm, 
it does not depict the past track. Other respondents 
argued that because they were now accustomed to 
the original image they did not want it changed. For 
example, “Those of us that have lived in the path of 
these storms are familiar with, and used to, the way 
you have been clearly warning us and informing us. 
Please do not let a few people, who may not have been 
paying attention, cause you to change your system 
unless you believe . . . know . . . that you have a better 
system.”
OPTION 2 (FIG. 8). Option 2 (Fig. 8) merely removed 
the connecting track line, while leaving the dated 
black dots representing projected future locations 
of the storm center. Option 2 was the least preferred 
graphic. Of those who did prefer this version, many 
argued that even though they liked the original image 
(Fig. 7), they saw the need to remove the line that 
had been the source of so much confusion. Thus, 
they felt option 2 served this need . . . “I think that 
the Hurricane Center should keep the graphics the 
way they are, but if you are wanting to change the 
graphics because there seems to be too much focus on 
the storm track and not the cone then I would go with 
the graphic #2 [Fig. 8]. It is something that people 
are already familiar with and without the line maybe 
there would be less focus on the track line.”
Similarly, one respondent wrote, I prefer the 
second, or Graphic #2 [Fig. 8], because it makes 
everything perfectly clear. It gives the impression that 
everyone in the area depicted is vulnerable, and must 
prepare. You are not distracted by the line in the first 
graphic or those confusing circles in graphic number 
3 [Fig. 9]. By contrast, one respondent complained 
that “[I] mentally connected the dots and made a 
track in my mind; that negates the changes you made 
with Graphic 2.”
OPTION 3 (FIG. 9). The graphic receiving the second 
most votes was option 3, which provided neither 
a skinny black line nor dated points, but instead a 
series of concentric circles. One respondent stated, 
“The third option—colored circles—is clearly the 
best. One of the stations used this option for its own 
broadcasts, and it seemed to be much less confusing, 
as it eliminates the urge to ‘believe’ the line is THE 
track.” Similarly, another respondent commented, “I 
think that the third chat [chart] would help the most. 
for [sic] the first one it looks like only hte peole [sic] 
on the line are in danger. but [sic]on the third it looks 
like everyone in that area hass [sic] a chance of getting 
hit by the hurricane.” Another respondent argued that 
“Tracking Chart 3a [Fig. 9a] and 3b [Fig. 9b] on your 
website is the least likely to be misinterpreted by the 
media, public and emergency agencies.”
Some respondents, however, still seemed to mis-
understand the graphic. One said they liked option 3 
best because it illustrated “the area that it [the storm] 
is effecting [sic].” In fact none of the graphics repre-
sent the potentially affected area or swath of destruc-
tion—they only depict the potential track of the eye, 
not the impact zone. Many respondents also did not 
understand that option 3 and option 1 (the original 
graphic) provided much of the same information. 
For example, “I think graphic 3 [Fig. 9] would be the 
most effective because it gives more possible locations 
and more choices of where it could move.” “I prefer 
Alternative #3. I think that it gives people in those 
potential areas more time to prepare their home for 
the oncoming storm.” “I think Graphic 3 [Fig. 9] is 
the best choice since it shows more possibilities.” 
Interestingly, some respondents apparently experi-
enced visual illusions, believing that Options 2 and 
3 depicted a bigger cone of uncertainty: “Graphic 2 
[Fig. 8] & 3 [Fig. 9] are too confusing and hard to 
follow. It gives a bigger cone of uncertainty . . .” “In 
graphic #3 [Fig. 9], big circles do no one any good and 
leaves too big of an area of probability and the general 
public would not follow your forecast as close.” In 
fact, none of these comments were accurate. All three 
graphics depicted cones of exactly the same size.
Last, some respondents believed that option 3 
offered more information than the other images. 
While the third image does provide a separate colored 
circle representing each particular time period, this 
TABLE 2. Preferences of respondents to the NHC 
request for comments as coded by NWS reviewers.
Preference Number of respondents
Option 1 (Fig. 7) 540
Option 2 (Fig. 8) 121





graphic actually provides less information because 
the skinny black line and dated points have been 
removed. It is possible that the mere addition of more 
circles gave the (wrong) impression that this version 
provides more information.
CONCLUSIONS. Hurricane forecasters have 
made impressive strides in both forecast accuracy 
and lead time, and, to a lesser extent, the ability to 
forecast storm characteristics, such as precipitation, 
spatial extent, storm surge, and wind speeds. The 
NHC cone of uncertainty represents the state of the 
art in forecast products. The image has been widely 
adopted and disseminated to the public by the 
media, in part because it is a graphic and thus tele-
genic (Lundgren and McMakin 1998). Yet the cone 
of uncertainty is a complicated figure, containing 
multiple messages represented by multiple graphical 
elements. Some of these elements, namely, the track 
line and the cone, have been blamed by some for 
having contributed (to an unspecified degree) to 
some public confusion during the 2004 hurricane 
season. Despite repeated warnings and targeted 
communication efforts by members of the forecast 
community, it appears that many people overly 
focused on the skinny black line (i.e., the track line). 
Some observed that the line did not pass through 
their locality and thus incorrectly assumed that 
they were safe, even if they were still within the 
cone, indicating that they did not understand that 
the actual track can vary anywhere within the cone. 
This suggests that the line actually subverts the key 
message of a graphic intended to convey uncertainty. 
Likewise, many people apparently focused on the 
skinny black line and assumed that only areas along 
the line were actually at threat, ignoring both the 
size and severity of the hurricane. The line itself, 
however, says nothing about how strong or large 
a storm is. Finally, many people focused on the 
boundaries of the cone and assumed that if they 
were outside of the boundaries they would not be 
impacted. Again, the boundaries only represent a 
range of uncertainty about the track of the eye. The 
cone does not provide any direct information about 
impact risk. Further, the cone itself accurately pre-
dicts the ultimate path of the hurricane center only 
about 2/3 of the time (J. Franklin 2005, personal 
communication).
At best, the line and cone provide only proxy 
information about potential hurricane damage, which 
is probably the information in which people are most 
interested. The most intense sustained winds in a 
hurricane are usually found near the eye; thus, in 
that limited sense, it does suggest who is most at risk. 
Again, however, the line says nothing about how big 
the eye or this particular hurricane is.
By now, public officials and NHC forecasters are 
keenly aware of peoples’ tendency to overly focus on 
the track line. In fact, several of the media outlets in our 
study now remove the track line when they reproduce the 
image for public consumption. Yet, two main arguments 
are made for keeping the line in the graphic. First, some 
respondents to the NHC survey said they preferred the 
original image containing the track line because they 
were now used to it. While true, the responses also 
indicate that some of these same people continue to 
misunderstand what the graphic actually depicts. Also, 
as described earlier, the solicitation for comments was 
conducted in manner that very likely resulted in a biased 
sample. Further, misunderstanding of the image by this 
group is especially troublesome because this sample (i.e., 
people interested in the National Hurricane Center Web 
site) ought to be less susceptible to misinterpretation 
than the general public.
A second argument for continuing to use the 
original graphic is made by some meteorologists 
who claim they have a responsibility to provide 
all the information that they have available. These 
proponents of “more information is better” argue 
that the skinny black line does provide additional 
information that people can use to make decisions. By 
itself, however, this is an insufficient argument. More 
information packed into a graphic is often confusing 
(Tufte 1983), and when people misunderstand the 
information, it can lead to flawed decision making: 
“Poorly designed or produced visuals are worse than 
no visual at all” (Hager and Scheiber 1997). In this 
case, one element—the track line—appears to be 
commonly misinterpreted and potentially subverts 
the message about uncertainty that the graphic is 
intended to convey.
We have only begun to understand how the diverse 
audiences in Florida actually interpret the cone of 
uncertainty. The above analysis focused on the 2004 
Atlantic hurricane season. The subsequent very active 
2005 season has further increased public attention on 
hurricanes, and a flurry of popular press publications 
dealing with storms has become available. As an ex-
ample of the continuing misinterpretation, we quote 
from a book written to help boat owners understand 
and prepare for storms:
A quick way to get a feel for the storm’s progress is to 
look at the forecasted path on the site’s map. [NHC 
Web site]. The anticipated storm path will be shown 
as a cone (which actually looks more like a wedge) 
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projected forward 3 days, with a different-colored 
cone projecting out 5 days. In both the 3- and 5-day 
projections, the wider cone of possibility shows the 
area the entire storm is expected to cover, and the 
narrower cone shows the area of highest wind and 
greater severity. The whole cone of possibility shows 
the geographical area the storm might impact. This 
cone of possible strike locations gives you some idea 
of the potential changes in direction the storm might 
take using current data (Burr 2006, 50–51).
This example is noteworthy and worrisome 
because the misinterpretations that we identify above 
continue to manifest in publications that are intended 
for educational purposes. The quote illustrates that, 
more broadly, even when people understand that the 
cone depicts uncertainty, they may still be confused 
about what specific event is being depicted (Fischhoff 
1994).
The challenge of producing a graphic that mini-
mizes misinterpretation raises the difficult question 
of what to include or exclude in a graphic. Mass media 
communication products (like the cone) are usu-
ally aimed at a broad, general audience with widely 
ranging education levels, languages, and cultural 
barriers. Graphics should therefore attract attention 
and convey a single key point in a simple, uncluttered 
style (Lundgren and McMakin 1998). The cone of 
uncertainty graphic produced by the NHC arguably 
provides too many different pieces of information, 
including the projected track line, the cone of uncer-
tainty, areas under a hurricane watch, areas under a 
tropical storm warning, different sustained wind 
speeds, and the distinction between potential track 
areas for days 1–3 versus 4–5. Few members of the 
general pubic are likely to study this image at length to 
absorb all of these different messages, even assuming 
they can understand them in the first place. Such a 
density of information also makes a distortion of the 
message by key intermediary communicators, such 
as the media, more likely.
Likewise, there is no perfect “one size fits all” 
image. No one presentation format or piece of in-
formation will be interpreted in the same way by all 
people. Many other factors influence risk percep-
tion and decision making, including the nature of 
the risk; the trustworthiness and credibility of the 
messenger; the knowledge, values, and worldviews 
of the recipient; etc. (Slovic 1999). Thus, the utility 
of any single risk communication product must be 
evaluated within the individual, social, and insti-
tutional contexts of the recipient. What to include 
and not include should in part be a function of who 
the intended audience is and their ability to handle 
different sorts of information (Doswell 2004). Thus, 
those developing risk communication products, 
like the cone of uncertainty, should consider the 
following questions: who is the intended audience 
and what information do they want and need (which 
they may not realize they need yet)? How relevant 
is this information, and does it provide enough 
detail for people to assess the risk to themselves, 
their property, or their communities (Fischhoff 
1994)? For example, some individuals and areas 
are more vulnerable to storm surge (coastlines), 
others to wind speed (trailer parks), while others 
are more vulnerable to the loss of electricity (e.g., 
those who rely on refrigerated medication). Merely 
knowing the likelihood that a hurricane might strike 
a particular area does not provide the more specific 
information people need to consider when assessing 
the risks and choosing a course of action. Of course 
there are many other sources of hurricane informa-
tion in addition to forecast graphics. Nonetheless, 
they should ideally be coordinated in order not to 
contradict each other. [e.g., people ignoring evacu-
ation orders because of their strategic (from a self-
serving psychological point of view) interpretation 
of uncertainty in a forecast graphic].
Given budget limitations, it may be unrealistic to 
expect agencies to tailor-make different products for 
different audiences ranging from ethnic subgroups, 
to local emergency managers, to the elderly. A first 
step might be to produce a relatively simple graphic 
to communicate the most vital information using 
the elements most likely to be correctly interpreted 
by the widest possible audience. A subsequent step 
might be to design more sophisticated versions of 
the simple graphic, containing additional informa-
tion for emergency managers, FEMA officials, etc. 
Because the NHC already has close relations with 
these emergency management groups (see, e.g., www.
hurricanemeeting.com), they have the opportunity to 
explain complex graphics in more depth. Nonetheless, 
the optimal design of these products is an empirical 
research question requiring controlled experiments 
testing alternative products.
Hurricane warning imagery continues to evolve 
in response to societal needs. Experimental graphics, 
such as the wind speed probability graphic, to be 
made operational in 2006 are currently being devel-
oped and have been offered to the public via the NHC 
Web site (Fig. 10). In addition, some news stations 
have already begun to adopt and adapt these new 
graphics (e.g., aesthetically and by adding or subtract-
ing information).
664 MAY 2007|
More broadly, uncertainty is a 
difficult concept to communicate. 
“Many people are unfamiliar with 
uncertainty in risk assessment and 
in science in general, making the job 
of the risk communicators all the 
more challenging” (Lundgren and 
McMakin 1998). As a whole, research 
has found that increased uncertainty 
leads to greater perceived risk (Slovic 
et al. 1986). The current cone of 
uncertainty, however, while explic-
itly providing information about 
uncertainty, does so using graphic 
elements that seem paradoxically to 
lead many to perceive lower risk, as 
experienced with Hurricane Charley. 
The skinny black line and the outlines 
of the cone itself apparently led many 
to overestimate the certainty of the 
projected track; therefore, if they 
did not live within the vicinity of 
the track line, or alternatively lived 
just outside the boundaries of the 
cone, they incorrectly concluded that 
they were not at risk. Ironically, a graphic intended to 
convey uncertainty may have had the opposite effect, 
at least with some members of the public.
The communication of hurricane risk is an 
essential function of both the government and 
private sector. Decision makers at all levels, from 
individuals to institutions, now rely, at least in part, 
on these messages to make critical decisions about 
hurricane preparedness and evacuation. The cone of 
uncertainty has quickly become a central figure in 
the communication of hurricane risks. Yet we still 
know relatively little about how audiences actually 
interpret, evaluate, or utilize this key graphic. Social 
science methods and approaches should be integrated 
into the design, development, and evaluation of 
hurricane risk communications, which are so vital 
for the well being of the public.
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